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JUDICIAL JURISDICTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES: A COMPARISON 
Friedrich Juenger* 
I signed up for the first seminar Eric Stein taught at Ann Arbor before 
the Rome Treaty instituting the Economic Community was ratified and 
when the European Coal and Steel Community was still young. European 
integration has long since become an economic and political reality. To be 
sure, the Communities have had their ups and downs, as has Europe's rela-
tionship with the United States. But despite the Common Market's current 
woes and the complaints of American farmers about European protection-
ism, we should not overlook the fact that the Communities present the most 
impressive experiment in supranationalism the world has seen. For lawyers 
in this country, the Communities' law and institutions present a tempting 
field of inquiry because, as Justice Potter Stewart remarked, "there are im-
portant similarities in the goals and institutional characteristics of the two 
systems," and because the Communities' "Court of Justice has been called 
upon to play a role that . . . appears very similar to that performed by the 
Supreme Court of the United States."1 
Eric Stein deserves our gratitude for making European integration ac-
cessible to American students and teachers. He has taught and written 
widely on this important subject, and the casebook he published with Hay 
and Waelbroeck2 is a valuable aid for dispelling what a judge of the Com-
munities' Court of Justice called "splendid mutual ignorance."3 Following 
Judge Pescatore's suggestion that it is time to take note of the experience 
gathered on both sides of the Atlantic,4 it seems worthwhile to compare the 
evolution of jurisdictional principles in the United States and in the Com-
mon Market.5 
• Professor of Law, University of California at Davis. M.C.L. 1957, University of Michi-
gan; J.D. 1960, Columbia University.- Ed. 
1. Stewart, Foreword, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS vii (f. Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 
1982); see also Preface, HARMONIZATION OF LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES vii (P. 
Herzog ed. 1983). 
2. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
IN PERSPECTIVE (1976). 
3. Pescatore, Foreword, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS, supra note 1, at x. 
4. Id 
5. Justice White has noted that the United States is a "common market" whose component 
states have retained attributes of sovereignty. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). As his felicitous observation suggests, the functions which jurisdic-
tional principles must serve in this country and in the European Communities are sufficiently 
similar to warrant comparison. 
1195 
1196 Michigan Law Review 
I. AMERICAN LAW 
(Vol. 82:ll95 
The American law of jurisdiction has been shaped primarily by the 
United States Supreme Court which, for well over a century, has claimed 
the power to control state jurisdictional practices. Originally, it derived this 
power from the full faith and credit clause,6 until a dictum in Pennoyer v. 
Ne.If' established that "proceedings in a court of justice to determine the 
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no juris-
diction do not constitute due process oflaw."8 To delineate the jurisdiction 
of state courts, about which the fourteenth amendment was silent, Justice 
Field's opinion in Pennoyer invoked legal history and dogma. He defined 
due process to mean "a course oflegal proceedings according to those rules 
and principles which have been established in our systems of jurispru-
dence."9 But he also cited Story's conflicts treatise10 to support the proposi-
tions that "every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over 
persons and property within its territory" and that "no tribunal . . . can 
extend its process beyond that territory to subject either persons or property 
to its decisions."11 From these premises Justice Field concluded that, with 
limited exceptions,12 jurisdiction can only be acquired by a symbolic exer-
cise of sovereignty: personal service of process within the state to proceed in 
personam and the attachment of local assets for actions quasi in rem. 
Justice Field's opinion demonstrates the pitfalls of undiscerning reliance 
on dogmatic considerations. His effort to elevate common law practices to 
the status of immutable constitutional principle proved to be seriously mis-
guided. Due process and state sovereignty do not easily mix because states' 
rights have little in common with the protection of individual freedoms and 
the attempt to blend these disparate ingredients was bound to breed anoma-
lies. As Justice Hunt's dissent points out, it is unconvincing to let the con-
stitutionality of state court jurisdiction hinge on the elusive distinction 
between actions in personam and in rem .13 Nor is it possible to explain why 
some magic act such as service or attachment should be required for assert-
ing sovereign prerogatives. Equally fl.awed are the policy reasons that Jus-
tice Field adduced to justify premising jurisdiction on the ministrations of 
process servers and sheriffs, for his arguments confuse the requirement of 
6. See Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404,406 (1856); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 
52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174-75 (1850); cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 (1878). 
7. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
8. 95 U.S. at 733. The fourteenth amendment had not yet been enacted when the state 
court judgment at issue was rendered. 
9. 95 U.S. at 733. 
IO. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19, 22, 682 (7th ed. 1872). 
11. 95 U.S. at 722, 723 (citing STORY, supra note IO, at ch. 2 & § 539). 
12. These exceptions were divorce jurisdiction and jurisdiction over a foreign "partnership 
or association." 95 U.S. at 734-35. 
13. See 95 U.S. at 737-38, 748. The parties inPennoyer claimed title to Oregon land which 
Pennoyer had bought at a sheriffs sale conducted to satisfy an Oregon default judgment. At 
issue was the validity of that judgment, which a third party had obtained against Neff, a resi-
dent of California. Justice Field's opinion concedes that if the third party had attached Neffs 
land before, rather than after, judgment and had proceeded qu(lSi in rem, Pennoyer would 
have acquired good title. See 95 U.S. at 723-24, 733. 
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notice with the power to adjudicate.14 Worse yet, the Court's insistence on 
practices rooted in medieval usages15 discouraged state experimentation at 
a time when the deficiencies of the procedural law this country had inher-
ited were widely recognized. Ironically, a quarter of a century before Pen-
noyer, tradition-bound England had enacted the Common Law Procedure 
Act, 16 which permitted service abroad and thereby authorized the very "ex-
traterritoriality" Justice Field condemned. 
Thus the Supreme Court, left to its own devices, started off on the wrong 
foot. Jurisdiction that rests on the service of transients or the attachment of 
goods which pass through a state is obviously exorbitant if it can be used to 
litigate facts that have no connection with the forum. Pennoyer prompted 
process servers to hound hapless travellers, 17 if need be in airplanes, 18 and 
to lure defendants away from their home state to gain an unfair advantage. 
Similarly, by attaching assets in remote locations unscrupulous plaintiffs 
could put defendants to the choice of either litigating in an inconvenient 
forum or losing their property. Up to a point, the courts could curb the 
most egregious abuses of such tag jurisdiction by inventing antidotes, such 
as the forum non conveniens doctrine19 and defenses premised on fraud 
principles.20 But it proved difficult to cope with the obverse defect of Pen-
noyer, ie., its failure to provide a forum for meritorious causes where 
neither the defendant nor sufficient property could be found within the 
state. 
Corporate defendants, in particular, were hard to "find" and slap with a 
summons. In Saint Clair v. Cox ,21 Justice Field suggested that the problem 
posed by such artificial entities could be resolved by requiring foreign cor-
porations to agree to the appointment of a local agent as a target for local 
process servers, which agreement "may be implied as well as expressed."22 
Taking their cue from this case, state courts and legislatures began to de-
velop a new jurisdictional rationale. Foreign corporations that failed to ap-
point local agents for service of process were held amenable to jurisdiction 
on an "implied consent" theory. Liberally mixing fact with fiction, courts 
deduced the "consent" and "presence" of such entities from the business 
they did in the forum state.23 But Pennoyer also posed some difficulties as 
14. See 95 U.S. at 726-27. 
15. For the evolution of English notions of process in co=on law and equity courts, see 9 
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 250-56, 348-51 {3d ed. 1944). 
16. Co=on Law Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Viet., ch. 76. The current rules on English 
long-arm jurisdiction derive from Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court promulgated 
pursuant to the 1875 Judicature Act, 38 & 39 Viet., ch. 77. See generally G. CHESHIRE & P. 
NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-95 (9th ed. 1974). 
17. For a judicial reaction against such transient jurisdiction, see Fisher, Brown & Co. v. 
Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 143-44, 34 A. 714, 729-30 (1895) (Hamersley, J., dissenting). 
18. See Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
19. See A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 121-22 (1962). 
20. See, e.g., Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937); Blandin v. Ostrander, 239 
F. 700 (2d Cir. 1917). 
21. 106 U.S. 350 (1882). 
22. 106 U.S. at 356; see also Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). 
23. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the .Due Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 584-85 (1958). 
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applied to human beings. To be sure, a dictum in that case helped resolve 
the very common problem of divorce proceedings against absconding 
spouses24 and in Milliken v. Meyer25 the Supreme Court finally concluded 
that individuals can be sued at their domicile. But it was still necessary to 
fall back on the "implied consent" fiction developed in the corporate area 
to give local relief to persons who were run over by nonresident motorists.26 
By the time the Supreme Court condoned this subterfuge, it had become 
apparent that Pennoyer had succumbed to erosion and that a reorientation 
was needed to make the law of jurisdiction more practical and plausible. 
Drawing on the corporate and nonresident motorist cases, as well as the 
principle of domiciliary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in International 
Shoe Company v. Washington 21 articulated a novel principle. Retreating 
from the idea that the defendant's amenability to suit should depend on a 
symbolic exercise of power, Justice Stone's opinion established that nonres-
idents can be sued locally if they have a sufficient relationship, certain 
"minimum contacts," with the forum state. If these contacts are "continu-
ous and systematic" (as in the case of intensive business activities in the 
forum state), then the foreign defendant is amenable to general jurisdiction, 
ie., suable even on unrelated causes of action. But if the defendant's rela-
tionship to the forum is more attenuated, he may still be subject to limited 
personal jurisdiction with respect to causes of action that arise from certain 
local contacts, such as the commission of a tort within the state. 
Although it retained the notion that due process is the fountainhead of 
jurisdiction, the Court inverted the relationship between the Constitution 
and the power of state courts. Pennoyer established that an adjudication 
comported with due process only if the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
common law principles. In contrast, International Shoe teaches that process 
is due, unless it transgresses "traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice."28 In other words, whereas Justice Field had ascertained compli• 
ance with due process from fixed jurisdictional rules, Justice Stone pur-
ported to deduce the outer limits of jurisdiction from the "vague due 
process clause."29 This new rationale expanded the potential reach of state 
jurisdiction. Once the Supreme Court abandoned its attempt to prescribe 
precise rules, the states were free to fashion new bases of jurisdiction, as 
long as they stayed within the nebulous confines of "minimum contacts" 
and "fair play." Seizing upon the opinion in International Shoe, state legis-
latures began to enact long-arm statutes to broaden their courts' power to 
adjudicate. 
One such statute, pursuant to which California asserted jurisdiction over 
foreign insurers that collected premiums in the state, was at issue in McGee 
24. 95 U.S. at 734-35. Justice Field tried to justify this deviation from the principle of 
territoriality by characterizing divorce as a matter of "status." 
25. 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
26. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
27. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
28. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting from Justice Douglas' opinion in Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 
457, 463 (1940)). 
29. 326 U.S. at 323 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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v. International L!fe Insurance Co.30 According to the opinion Justice 
Black wrote for a unanjmous Court, a single insurance policy which strad-
dled state lines sufficed to enable the California court to adjudicate the 
rights of the local beneficiary against a Texas corporation because the "con-
tract had a substantial connection with that State" and because California 
had a "manifest interest" in the resident plaintiff. 31 This language seemed 
to spell a further expansion of jurisdiction, for it suggested that the due 
process calculus does not necessarily require a nexus between the defendant 
and the forum. However, Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Han-
son v. Denckla32 rejected the substitution of _transactional contacts and fo-
rum interests for defendant contacts. Like Justice Field in Pennoyer, 
Warren emphasized the "territorial limitations on the power of the respec-
tive States,"33 from which he deduced the requirement of "some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection 
of its laws."34 Thus the idea that jurisdiction amounts to a quid pro quo for 
the defendant's pursuit of forum benefits, which underlies the "implied con-
sent" fiction,35 gained new currency. The Pennoyer power rationale was 
revived in modified form: the magic of defendant contacts replaced the 
magic of service, and once again due process coalesced with the notion of 
sovereignty. 36 
In the decades following this trilogy of decisions the Supreme Court 
routinely denied petitions for certiorari in jurisdictional cases, leaving the 
states free to experiment with long-arm legislation. Hesitantly at first, then 
more boldly, state courts and legislatures expanded local jurisdiction in 
multi-state cases. But while the direction was clear, the going proved tough. 
Interpreting the new statutes in the light of International Shoe, McGee and 
Hanson turned out to be an onerous task because of the amorphous nature 
of the Supreme Court's guidelines and the deficiencies of statutory drafts-
manship.37 To obviate the need for reconciling local legislation with consti-
30. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
31. 355 U.S. at 223. 
32. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
33. 357 U.S. at 251. 
34. 357 U.S. at 253. 
35. See Ratner, Procedural Due Process and Jurisdiction lo Adjudicate: (a) Effective Litiga-
tion Values vs. the Territorial Imperative, (h) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 75 
Nw. L. REV. 363, 369, 379-81, 420 (1980); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286, 311 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
36. Chief Justice Warren said in Hanson: 
[R]estrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of state courts] are more than a guarantee of 
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial 
limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defend-
ing in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has the 
"minimal contacts" with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over 
him. 
377 U.S. at 25. 
37. The verbose and inanely worded Texas long-arm statute offers a telling example. See 
TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & 1982-83). Even more carefully drafted 
enactments are far from satisfactory, as shown by Pennsylvania's experimentation with the 
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, which had to be amended several times. 
See Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Ind. Corp., 526 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1975); Gorso v. 
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tutional mandates, which required judges to wrestle with two sets of 
precepts at the same time, several states enacted statutes that simply con-
ferred jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the Supreme Court.38 
Some state courts achieved the same effect by construing local long-arm 
legislation, irrespective of the statutory text, as an incorporation by refer-
ence of the Supreme Court case law.39 . Thus, as a practical matter, state law 
and Supreme Court doctrine are once again converging. However, while 
the states increasingly availed themselves of the full range of permissible 
jurisdiction, at the end of the last decade the Supreme Court reverted to an 
interventionist stance. Breaking a long period of silence, it decided four 
jurisdictional cases in as many years, all of which struck down what the 
Court considered to be overly expansive exercises of state power. 
In Shaffer v. Heitner 40 the Court outlawed one remnant of Pennoyer, 
ie., quasi in rem jurisdiction to litigate claims unrelated to the property 
attached.41 According to Justice Marshall's majority opinion the constitu-
tionality of all state jurisdictional assertions must be tested against a single 
standard: that "set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."42 Subse-
quently, Kulko v. Superior Court 43 used the purposeful availment test pro-
pounded in Hanson to reverse a state court decision that would have 
enabled children to seek an increase of support payments in their home 
state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson44 held that the purposeful 
availment formula precluded the assertion of jurisdiction over the foreign 
distributor and retailer of a defective car. Finally, in Rush v. Savchuk ,45 the 
Court relied on its decision in Shaffer to bar litigation by a local tort plain-
tiff against a local insurance company because the plaintiff had proceeded 
against the nominal defendant on a quasi in rem theory. Whatever one 
might think of the practical wisdom of these four recent Supreme Court 
decisions,46 they do signal a retrenchment from the laissez-faire attitude of 
International Shoe. Whereas the "minimum contacts" test was designed to 
Bell Equip. Corp., 476 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1973); Comment, Pennsylvania's New Long-Arm 
Statute: Extended Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 79 DICK. L. REV. 51 (1974). The 
statute has since been revised to extend jurisdiction "to the fullest extent allowed under the 
Constitution of the United States." 42 PA. CONS. STAT, § 5322(b) (Purdon 1981). 
38. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. PROC. CODE§ 410.10 (West 1973) ("any basis not inconsistent with 
the Constitution of this state or of the United States"); N.J. R. CT, § 4:4-4(c)(l) ("consistent 
with due process of law"). 
39. See, e.g., Woodring v. Hall, 200 Kan. 597, 438 P.2d 135 (1968); Hall v. Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), revd., 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984), 
40. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
41. See 433 U.S. at 212 n.38. But see 433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (leaving open the question of 
recourse to attachment jurisdiction ''when no other forum is available to the plaintifl''); note 54 
infra. 
42. See 433 U.S. at 212. This includes Hanson's "purposeful availment" test. See 433 U.S. 
at 216. But see 433 U.S. at 208 n.30 (''we do not suggest that jurisdictional doctrines •.. such 
as particularized rules governing adjudication of status are inconsistent with the standards of 
fairness") ( citation omitted). 
43. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
44. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
45. 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
46. See Juenger, Supreme Court Intervention in Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: A JJisma/ 
Prospect, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 907, 909-14 (1981). 
April/May 1984] Jurisdiction: U.S. and European Communities 1201 
expand state court jurisdiction, the "purposeful availment" formula is 
meant to be restrictive. The Court's current insistence on a single jurisdic-
tional standard harkens back to Pennoyer, as does the statement in World-
Wide Volkswagen that the fourteenth amendment "acts to ensure" state 
sovereignty.47 Once again the Court seems willing to sacrifice the rational 
administration of interstate justice in deference to conceptualism and the 
myth of state sovereignty.48 
Preoccupation with dogma necessarily diverts attention from practical 
problems. This propensity is illustrated by Sha..ffer in which the Court, with 
commendable zeal, set out to eradicate one (if not both49) of the remnants 
of Pennoyer exorbitance. Regrettably, it picked a case in which quasi in rem 
jurisdiction was made to serve a purpose which, as Justice Marshall appar-
ently realized,50 was constitutionally unobjectionable, namely to concen-
trate actions against the management of a Delaware corporation in a 
Delaware court. By focusing on the jurisdictional rationale advanced, 
rather than the permissible range of state court jurisdiction, the majority 
opinion in Sha..ffer (as well as the one in Rush) recalls Justice Field's insis-
tence on form over substance.51 At the same time, these opinions ignore 
the needs of sound interstate procedure. Similarly, the Court's decision in 
World-Wide Volkswagen compels wasteful concurrent litigation of identical 
issues in different states. These examples suggest that rigid insistence on a 
single jurisdictional standard is apt to impede the efficient disposition of 
multi-party suits. Yet, it can also be argued that that standard is too broad 
because it enables plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations in states that have 
little or no connection with the facts. 52 Thus our current jurisdictional lore 
47. 444 U.S. at 292. According to Justice White, the "sovereignty of each State ... im-
plied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States - a limitation express or implicit 
in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment." 444 U.S. at 
293. 
48. See 444 U.S. at 294 ("Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience 
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a 
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most conve-
nient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate fed-
eralism, may sometimes act to divest a State of its power to render a valid judgment."). 
49. The adoption of a single standard would seem to render transient jurisdiction unconsti-
tutional. See, e.g., Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for Stale and Federal 
Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 425 n.74 (1981) (listing recent commentary opposing tran-
sient jurisdiction); Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer 
v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REV. 1031, 1035 (1978). Bui see Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 
273 S.E.2d 22 (1980). 
50. Justice Marshall's opinion suggests that Delaware could enact a statute, as some states 
have, which treats acceptance of a directorship in a Delaware corporation as an "implied con-
sent" to the jurisdiction of Delaware courts. 433 U.S. at 216. Delaware has since enacted such 
an implied consent statute. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (1982 Cum. Supp.). 
51. See note 13 supra. 
52. See Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate - The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 
14 U.C.D. L. REV. 889, 894-95 (1981); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction lo Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1144 (1966). Indeed, an instinctive appreciation of 
the possible overbreadth of "doing business" jurisdiction may explain the Supreme Court's 
decision in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980). But for that unstated consideration, it is 
difficult to understand why it should be unconstitutional to permit a local plaintiff to sue a 
"local" defendant in a local court. 
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once again suffers from the twin defects of Pennoyer: overbreadth and in-
sufficient coverage. 
But whereas Pennoyer explicitly delineated the jurisdictional bases state 
courts could use, the minimum-contacts-resulting-from-purposeful-avail-
ment formula is too fuzzy to furnish guidance in borderline cases. The split 
opinions in World-Wide Volkswagen show that even the· Justices cannot 
agree on its meaning, and the endless decisions that clutter the advance 
sheets suggest the difficulties state and lower federal courts encounter when 
forced to apply the test in practice. The resulting uncertainty allows even 
basic issues, such as whether a local seller can sue a foreign buyer53 and 
whether aliens are entitled to the same measure of due process as American 
citizens and residents,54 to remain unresolved. Thus, after more than a cen-
tury of experimentation, the American law of interstate jurisdiction is as 
muddled as ever. 
The Supreme Court's continued preoccupation with doctrine also ham-
pers inquiry into jurisdictional policies. For example, the Court and most 
legal writers accept the purposeful availment formula as a given, a natural 
consequence of territorial sovereignty. But if one looks at it through the 
eyes of a litigator, it becomes apparent that that formula has an inherent 
bias which favors individuals, particularly products liability claimants, who 
sue large enterprises engaged in nationwide activities. There may be good 
reasons for granting this class of plaintiffs a jurisdictional privilege,55 but 
one wonders why it should be withheld from other disadvantaged groups, 
such as the support claimants in Kulko. Conversely, while it may make 
sense to expose manufacturers of defective products to nationwide jurisdic-
tion, other classes of defendants, such as eleemosynary institutions, argu-
ably deserve a greater measure of protection against the hazards of forum 
shopping. Yet, the territorialist dogma that currently prevails makes no al-
lowance for distinctions of this kind. Blind to results, it treats General Mo-
tors in the same fashion as the Boy Scouts of America. 
American jurisdictional law can be expected to remain unstable until 
the Court resolves the inherent conflict between territorialism and "substan-
53. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984); Lake-
side Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980) (White & Powell, 
JJ., dissenting) denying cert. to 591 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979). 
54. Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984), and Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), assume the 
point without discussion. However, a contrary conclusion is suggested by a footnote in Sliaf-
ftr, which reads as follows: "This case does not raise, and we therefore do not consider, the 
question whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a sufficient basis for 
jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 211 n.37. This 
"cryptic statement," Papendick v. Robert Bosch GmbH, 410 A.2d 148, 150 n.S (Del. S. Ct. 
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980), has caused courts to split on the question whether alien 
defendants who lack minimum contacts.with the United States are still amenable to quasi in 
rem juI1l!diction. Compare Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. 
Conn. 1977) (yes), and Rich v. Rich, 93 Misc. 2d 409, 402 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (yes), 
with Majique Fashions Ltd. v. Warwick & Co. 96 Misc. 2d 808, 409 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup. Ct. 
1978),revd on other grounds, 61 App. Div. 2d 321,414 N.Y.S. 2d. 916 (1979) (no),and Istituto 
Bancario Italiano SpA v. Hunter Engg. Co., 449 A.2d 210, 216 n.10 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1982) 
(dubitante); see also note 116 iefra and accompanying text. 
55. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
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tialjustice." Awareness of the tension between these two components may 
have prompted Justice White to recant, two years ago, his earlier attempt to 
commingle the protection of defendants with the prerogatives of sover-
eignty. 56 fu.Insurance Corp. ef Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee 
he wrote: "The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an 
individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not 
as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."57 This 
opinion, in which seven of the Justices joined, could foreshadow a "sub-
stantial change in the law."58 The Supreme Court's most recent decisions, 
however, continue to apply the purposeful availment test in a mechanical 
fashion without regard to the policies and interests at stake. Thus, in two 
cases decided this term the Justices explicitly refused to consider first 
amendment concerns in upholding limited jurisdiction in libel actions 
brought against the publisher of one magazine, and the president/editor 
and a reporter of another.59 In consequence, because of the omnipresence 
of their "products," the media now face a greater jurisdictional exposure 
than manufacturers, a result whose wisdom is surely less than obvious. The 
latest case, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,60 reversed a 
Texas Supreme Court decision on the ground that the contacts of the de-
fendant, a Colombian corporation, with Texas were insufficient to justify 
the exercise of general jurisdiction in a tort action resulting from a helicop-
ter crash in Peru. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion assumes that alien 
corporations are entitled to the same constitutional protection as sister-state 
entities. Such evenhandedness is admirable, but one would have expected 
some discussion of the underlying rationale in light of.the uncertain state of 
the law and the divergent views held by the concurring and dissenting 
judges below. If these recent cases are any indication, the Court remains 
committed to a territorialist dogma that is unresponsive to substantive val-
ues and the exigencies of procedural policy. 
II. EUROPEAN LAW 
Compared with Anglo-American law continental Europe's history of ju-
risdictional law has been both longer and smoother. The Justinian Code 
already incorporated the maxim actor sequitur forum rei61 and thus antici-
pated the decision in Milliken v. Meyer,62 according to which the courts at 
the defendant's residence are entitled to exercise general personal jurisdic-
tion. In addition, Roman law recognized the concept of limited jurisdiction 
by permitting the plaintiff to sue in tort at the place of wrongful conduct, to 
bring contract actions at the place of execution or performance, and to vin-
56. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. 
57. 456 U.S. at 702 (footnote omitted). But cf. 456 U.S. at 702 n.10 (restriction of sovereign 
power as a "function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause"). 
58. 456 U.S. at 714 (Powell, J., concurring). 
59. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 
1473 (1984). 
60. 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984). 
61. Code Just. 3.19.3, 3.13.2; see M. KASER, DAS ROMISCHE ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 183,478 
(1966). 
62. 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
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dicate property rights at the situs.63 In other words, fourteen hundred years 
before International Shoe, the civil law, unhampered by constitutional doc-
trine and territorialist dogma, already premised jurisdiction on "minimum 
contacts," and this idea continues to inform current European jurisdictional 
law.64 Conversely, the Pennoyer principles that for so long retarded the 
evolution of American law never appealed to civilians. 65 
However, the codes of several European countries do contain provisions 
that are even more exorbitant than our former catch-as-catch-can jurisdic-
tion. Thus, section 23 of the German Civil Procedure Code provides for in 
personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who own assets in Ger-
many. 66 This provision does not require a prior attachment or any nexus 
between the litigation and the Federal Republic. Also, unlike the Oregon 
statute before the United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer, section 23 
does not limit jurisdiction to the value of the German assets and is therefore 
yet more blatantly unfair than the quasi in rem jurisdiction67 outlawed by 
Shaffer. The forum-shopping potential of the German rule should be read-
ily apparent. Practically any large enterprise in the world is likely to have 
some assets, such as an open account or an equity interest, in the Federal 
Republic, and even nonresident individuals, for instance tourists who leave 
personal objects behind, may feel the sting of this provision.68 Since Ger-
man law does not provide for a special appearance,69 a foreign defendant 
cannot even contest the presence of local property without submitting to 
jurisdiction;.nor is a default judgment based on a plaintiff's spurious allega-
tion that the defendant owned something in the Federal Republic open to 
collateral attack.70 Yet more exorbitant than the German assets jurisdiction 
is the rule derived from article 14 of the French Civil Code,71 which enables 
French plaintiffs to sue anyone in French courts72 whether or not the dis-
pute has any connection with France. At the same time article 15 of the 
Code provides that Frenchmen can only be sued in France. Although this 
blatant jurisdictional chauvinism has been criticized in and outside 
France,73 several European nations have copied the French scheme in one 
63. M. KASER, supra note 61, at 184, 478. 
64. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 363 (4th ed. 1980); Weser, Bases of Judicial 
Jurisdiction in the Common Market Countries, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 328-36 (1961). 
65. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 362, 363; Pillet, Jurisdiction in Actions Between For-
eigners, 18 HARV. L. REV. 325, 335 (1905). 
66. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 372-73; deVries & Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction in Per-
sona/Actions-A Comparison of Civil Law Views, 4410WA L. REV. 306, 332-34 (1959); Weser, 
supra note 64, at 327-28. 
61. See Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: 
The Common Market .Draft, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 995, 1004-06 (1967). 
68. For a vivid and poetic account of Jean Claude Killy's experience in Austria, (which, 
like the Federal Republic, authorizes assets jurisdiction), see Siegel, Case & Comment, In Va-
grant Verse, 16 CASE & COM. Sept.-Oct. 1971, at 56, 62-63. 
69. See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 391 n.l. 
10. See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 380-81. 
11. See deVries & Lowenfeld, supra note 66, at 316-30; Weser, supra note 64, at 324-25. 
72. The only American analogue is divorce jurisdiction, for which the petitioner's domicile 
suffices. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). 
73. See, e.g., 2 H. BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 483 (7th ed. 
1983); M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2d ed. 1950). 
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form or another.74 To make matters worse, continental European countries 
do not recognize the forum non conveniens doctrine,75 so that their courts 
cannot decline jurisdiction even if a suit is brought solely to harass the 
defendant. 
Thus, pursuant to the laws of several European nations, jurisdiction is 
largely controlled by the law of the jungle, and unfortunately their recogni-
tion practices are as narrow as their jurisdictional assertions are broad, ex-
cept to the extent that treaties afford relief. Such a state of affairs hardly 
accords with the needs of a quasi-federal system like the Common Market. 
But the architects of the Communities, less prescient than the framers of the 
United States Constitution, failed to include precepts akin to our due pro-
cess and full faith and credit clauses in the constitutive documents. The 
only pertinent provision is found in article 220 of the Rome Treaty76 which, 
among other things, exhorts the member states to enter into negotiations 
"with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ... the simplifi-
cation of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement 
of judgments .... " The committee of experts appointed to draft a con-
vention that would implement this provision recognized that its scope was 
much too narrow. Stretching the word "formalities" far beyond its normal 
meaning, the experts elaborated a "modern, liberal law"77 that put the in-
tra-European recognition of judgments on a solid treaty basis. In general 
outline and numerous details the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters78 closely 
resembles the rules which the United States Supreme Court developed 
under the due process and full faith and credit clauses. There are, however, 
several instructive differences. 
The framers of the Brussels Convention had a dual advantage. They 
could draft on a clean slate, unconstrained by precedent and dogma, yet 
they were free to draw on rules and principles existent in the laws of the 
Communities' member states,79 including earlier treaties and conventions 
to which these nations were parties.80 Although the available sources are 
74. See Weser, supra note 64, at 324-27. 
75. See Schlosser, Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Den-
mark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Conven-
tion on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and 
to the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 59) 71, 
97 (Mar. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Schlosser Report]. 
76. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11 (entered into force Jan. I, 1958). 
77. Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 59) I, 7 (Mar. 5, 1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Jenard Report]. 
78. Sep. 27, 1968, 15 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 299) 32 (Dec. 31, 1972) (entered into force 
Feb. I, 1973). The convention was first revised to accommodate the accession of Denmark, 
Ireland, and Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. 77 (No. L 304) (Oct. 
30, 1978). It was again amended upon the accession of Greece. 25 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 
388) I (1982). Citations are to the latest version which has not yet entered into force [hereinaf-
ter cited as Brussels Convention]. 
79. See Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 3-6 (recognition of judgments); id at 14-83 
(jurisdiction). 
80. See Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 6-7. 
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silent on this point,81 one may surmise that the committee of experts also 
consulted the laws of such federal systems as the United States, Switzerland 
and Australia. Whatever the scope of its comparative research, the commit-
tee made good use of the available materials. In superimposing a new order 
on the member states' discordant, and often xenophobic, jurisdictional and 
recognition practices82 the experts plainly emulated American law. They 
realized the cogency of the principle which the United States Supreme 
Court had established early on, namely that the enforcement of a judgment 
should hinge primarily on the jurisdiction of the court that rendered it. To 
assure the congruence of adjudicatory power and judgment recognition, the 
experts were not content merely to circumscribe the outer limits of permissi-
ble member state jurisdiction as the Supreme Court did in International 
Shoe. Instead, they defined the appropriate jurisdictional bases as a matter 
of supranational law. Like Justice Field in Pennoyer, the draftsmen could 
rely on "rules and principles established in our [European] systems of juris-
prudence,"83 except that they had more to work with. Although the note 
which the Common Market Commission had sent to the member states in 
1959 to invite negotiations on the Convention maintained that 'Jurisdiction 
. . . is derived from . . . sovereignty,"84 the experts did not attempt to de-
duce rules from that dubious concept but preferred to make their choices of 
jurisdictional provisions on grounds of policy and common sense. Realiz-
ing that exorbitance is incompatible with basic tenets of interstate comity, 
they outlawed the use against Common Market domiciliaries of article 14 
of the French Civil Code and section 23 of the German Civil Procedure 
Code, as well as kindred provisions of other nations. 85 They also replaced 
the nonexorbitant member state rules with a catalog of detailed jurisdic-
tional bases suitable to the needs of the Communities' quasi-federal system. 
In this fashion the experts produced a "double convention"86 that, in Amer-
ican parlance, combines a long-arm statute and full faith and credit in a 
single instrument. 
In broad outline, the jurisdictional scheme of the Brussels Convention is 
as follows: 
I. The courts at the defendant's domicile (or, in the case of an enterprise, 
its principal place of business87) have general jurisdiction;88 
2. Enterprises that maintain a branch or other establishment in a member 
state can be sued there on causes of action arising out of these local 
81. The Jenard, supra note 77, and Schlosser, supra note 75, Reports do not refer to any 
such comparative researches. Regrettably, the preparatory work of the commission of experts 
has not been published. See G. DROZ, COMPETENCE JUDICIAJRE ET EFFETS DES JUOEMENTS 
DANS LE MARCHE COMMUN 2 (1977). 
82. The member states' jurisdictional exorbitance is matched by the narrow-mindedness of 
their recognition practices. See Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 3-6, 19-20. 
83. See text at note 9 supra. 
84. Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 3. 
85. See Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 3. 
86. Herzog, The Common Market Convention on Jurisdiction and the Eeforcement of Judg-
ments: An Interim Update, 11 VA. J. INTL. L. 417, 420 n.16 (1977). The official report speaks 
of a "convention based on rules of direct jurisdiction." Jenard Report, supra note 77, at 7. 
87. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 53, par. I. 
88. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 2, par. I. 
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operations;89 
3. Limited personal jurisdiction is provided for contract90 and tort91 
actions; 
4. There is exclusive local jurisdiction in actions concerning real f rop-
erty,92 the internal affairs of corporations and other associations,9 and 
rights recorded in public registers;94 
5. Certain classes of plaintiffs, i.e., consumers, policyholders and support 
claimants, are accorded the jurisdictional privilege to litigate in the mem-
ber state in which they are domiciled;95 
6. Special rules liberally authorize joining and impleading parties not 
otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the court in which the principal 
action is pending;96 
7. By means of forum-selection clauses the parties can stipulate to the 
jurisdiction of member state courts.97 
The Convention's jurisdictional provisions compare favorably with our 
long-arm statutes. In contrast to American state legislators, who had to 
take into account not altogether consistent Supreme Court pronounce-
ments, the European draftsmen could rely on their own best judgment, 
which helped make their work product tidier, more functional and more 
precise. In particular, they were able to design appropriate rules to govern 
multi-party practice and to accord jurisdictional privileges to certain disad-
vantaged groups, provisions that would not pass our Supreme Court's con-
stitutional muster. In this respect the Brussels Convention may appear 
permissive to an American observer; however, it also protects enterprises 
against undue jurisdictional exposure. In contrast to the uncertainty which 
prevails in the United States concerning the extent to which foreign corpo-
rations doing business locally are amenable to general jurisdiction,98 the 
Convention is quite specific. According to articles 2 and 53, par. 1, unre-
lated causes of action can only be brought at a member state corporation's 
principal place of business. Local operations expose such entities to limited 
jurisdiction only, and even if they "do business" through a local branch, 
89. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 5, No. 5. 
90. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 5, No. I {place of performance). 
91. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 3, No. 3 (place of"harmful event"). In view of 
the fact that a number of European countries permit private parties to seek damages incidental 
to a criminal proceeding, see R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 457-61, the Convention also 
provides for concurrent jurisdiction over civil claims raised in criminal cases. See art. 5, No. 4. 
Special provisions govern litigation relating to trusts (art. 5, No. 6) and salvage claims (art. 5, 
No. 7). 
92. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 16, No. I (situs). 
93. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 16, No. 2 (principal place of business). 
94. Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 16, Nos. 3 and 4 (place of registration). 
95. See Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 14 (consumer transactions, as defined in 
art. 13); art. 8, par. 2 (policyholders); art. 5, No. 2 (support claimants); see also art. 9 (liability 
and real property insur~rs suable at place of harm) and art. 10, pars. 2 and 3 (direct actions). 
96. See Brussels Convention, supra note 78, art. 6, Nos. I and 2; see also art. 6, No. 3 
(counterclaims). 
97. See Brussels Convention,supra note 78, art. 17. Articles 12 ~d 15 restrict the contrac-
tual designation of a forum in cases involving policyholders and consumers. 
98. See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 297-302, 332-37 (1982); note 52 supra 
and accompanying text. 
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article 5(5) restricts jurisdiction to causes of action related to the branch's 
activities. 
To assure uniform application of these jurisdictional rules, the member 
states of the Common Market have ratified a Protocol99 that provides for 
supranational review by empowering the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities to interpret the Convention upon a reference from national 
courts. 100 Since 1976 the Court has issued rulings in over thirty cases that 
have dealt with a wide variety of issues, ranging from jurisdiction in a ma-
jor international pollution litigation101 to the enforcement of a Belgian 
small claims court judgment in the Netherlands. 102 The case law accumu-
lated within the relatively short span of eight years103 sensibly elaborates 
and clarifies the Convention's rules. Given the firm guidance provided by 
specific and well thought out provisions, the task of the Court of Justice as 
the ultimate arbiter of the Common Market's law of jurisdiction and en-
forcement of judgments is less demanding than that facing the United 
States Supreme Court. At the same time, the European court has shown 
considerable creativity in giving many of these rules a supranational con-
tent to ensure uniformity of application. 104 Moreover, several of its deci-
99. Protocol on the Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of27 Septem-
ber 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 304) 50 (Oct. 30, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Protocol]. 
100. The procedure of referring issues to the Court of Justice resembles that for prelimi-
nary rulings pursuant to art. 177 of the Rome Treaty, which is discussed in Hay & Thompson, 
The Community Court and Supremacy of Community Law: A Progress Report, 8 V AND. J. 
TRANSNATL. L. 651 (1975). However, there are several significant differences between the two 
methods of supranational review. See Kohler, The Case Law of the European Court on t/1e 
Judgments Convention, Part I, 7 EUR. L. REV. 3, 4-6 (1982). 
IOI. Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace S.A. (Case No. 21/76), 
1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735 (Preliminary Ruling). 
102. De Wolfv. Harry Cox B.V. (Case No. 42/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1759 (Pre-
liminary Ruling). 
103. For a review of cases decided up to June of 1981, see Kohler, supra note 100, and 
Kohler, Part II, 1 EUR. L. REV. 103 (1982); see a/.ro Freeman, The EEC Convention on Jurisdic-
tion and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments, 3 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 496 (1981), 
104. Although the Court of Justice does consult the laws of the Common Market nations 
in giving content to the terms of the Brussels Convention, it tends to favor an "autonomous" 
interpretation, i.e., to fashion its own definitions rooted in supranational law. As the court said 
in an early case: 
(T]o ensure, as far as possible, that the rights and obligations which derive from [the 
Brussels Convention] for the Contracting States and the persons to whom it applies are 
equal and uniform .... the concept in question must therefore be regarded as mdepen-
dent and must be interpreted by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of the Con-
vention and, secondly, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of the 
national legal systems. 
LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v. Eurocontrol (Case No. 29/76), 1976 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1541, 1551 (Preliminary Ruling) (interpreting the phrase "civil and com-
mercial matters" in art. I of the Convention). For other instances of"independent" characteri-
zation, see Somafer SA v. Saar-Ferngas AG (Case No. 33/78), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2183 
(Preliminary Ruling) (definition of"branch, agency or other establishment" in art. 5, no. 5 of 
the Convention); Sanders v. van der Pulte (Case No. 73/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2383 
(Preliminary Ruling) ( definition of "tenancies of immovable property" in art. 16, no. I of the 
Convention) . .But see Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG (Case No. 12/76), 1976 E. 
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473 (Preliminary Ruling) ("place of performance of the obligation in 
question" in art. 5, no. I of the Convention defined by member state law applicable to such 
obligation pursuant to the forum's conflict oflaws rules). For discussion and evaluation of the 
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sions show commendable concern about both fairness in adjudication 105 
and important substantive policies. 106 
In at least one respect the Court of Justice has clearly gone beyond the 
mere interpretation of preordained rules. Early on, the European judges, 
hypothesizing a link between the Brussels Convention and the Rome 
Treaty, established that the fundamental principles which inform the Com-
mon Market's constitutive documents also apply to the Convention.107 
This idea has far-reaching implications. The court has long recognized that 
the Communities' legal order must adequately protect human rights, and it 
has claimed the power to create the necessary safeguards from constitu-
tional provisions found in the laws of the member states and in the Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention.108 Hence, the court can be expected to 
intervene against jurisdictional practices that jeopardize fundamental 
rights. A first step in this direction is its emphasis on the opportunity to be 
heard 109 and other aspects of procedural faimess. 110 
court's development of supranational concepts, see Freeman, supra note 103, at 504-06, 508; 
Kohler, supra note 100, at 7-13. 
The national/supranational conflicts posed by the Brussels Convention correspond to the 
state/federal conflicts problems which the Supreme Court has encountered in other contexts. 
Compare United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (holding state law to be 
controlling), with Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding federal 
law to be controlling). 
105. See Pendy Plastic Prods. B.V. v. Pluspunkt Handelsgesellschaft GmbH (Case No. 
228/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2723 (Preliminary Ruling) (to protect defendant's right to 
be heard, the court in which recognition is sought may review the adequacy of service); 
Klomps v. Michel (Case No. 166/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1593 (Preliminary Ruling) 
(recognition court may review sufficiency of time to arrange for defense); Elefanten Schuh 
GmbH v. Jacqmain, (Case No. 150/80), 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1671 (Preliminary Ruling) 
(defendant entitled to present jurisdictional objections together with defenses on the merits); 
Denilauler v. S.n.c. Couchet Freres (Case No. 125/79), 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1553 (Pre-
liminary Ruling) (ex parte attachment not entitled to recognition in other member states). 
106. See, e.g., Ivenel v. Schwab, (Case No. 133/81), 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1891 (Pre-
liminary Ruling) ("place of performance" in art. 5, no. 1 construed to confer jurisdiction on 
courts of employee's place of work to protect weaker party); Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier B.V. v. 
Mines de Potasse d'Alsace (Case No. 21/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735 (Preliminary 
Ruling) (place of "harmful event" construed to allow tort victim a choice between suing at 
place of defendant's conduct or at place of injury). 
107. In its very first judgment on the Brussels Convention the court stressed that "the Con-
vention must be interpreted having regard both to its principles and objectives and to its rela-
tionship with the [Rome] Treaty." lndustrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG (Case No. 
12/76), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1473, 1484 (Preliminary Ruling). In Bavaria Fluggesell-
schaft Schwabe & Co. v. Eurocontrol (Case Nos. 9 and 10/77), 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
1517, 1525, (Preliminary Ruling), the court referred to the "principle oflegal certainty in the 
Community legal system and the objectives of the Brussels Convention in accordance with 
Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, which is at its origin." See Kohler, supra note 100, at 14. 
108. See, e.g., J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission of the Eur. 
Communities (Case No. 4/73), 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491; Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, (Case No. 11/70), 
1970 C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 1125 (Preliminary Ruling); Stauder v. Ulm, (Case No. 29/69), 1969 
C. J. Comm. E. Rec. 419 (Preliminary Ruling); see also Dagtoglou, Human Rights and Euro-
pean Community Law, 56 TuL. L. REV. 294 (1981); Juenger, The Role of Comparative Law in 
Regional Organizations, in LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TECHNI-
CAL REVOLUTION 49, 60-63 (J. Hazard & w. Wagner eds. 1974); The Emerging European 
Constitution, [1978] AM. SOCY. INTL. L. PROC. 166. 
109. See note 105 supra and accompanying text. 
I 10. See AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission of the Eur. Communities (Case No. 155/79), 
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For the American observer, the procedure under the Protocol to the 
Brussels Convention holds an interesting lesson. The pertinent rules111 en-
able the member state governments112 to present their views in statements 
and written observations addressed directly to the court, and they have 
availed themselves of this opportunity on numerous occasions. 113 Al-
though the governments frequently side with their nationals' legal position, 
the summaries published in the reports do not reveal much concern on the 
part of these governments about a possible infringement of their sover-
eignty. Thus, there is empirical evidence for Justice White's remark in 
Compagnie des Bauxites that jurisdictional issues touch upon individual lib-
erty interests rather than state prerogatives.114 This evidence is all the more 
convincing if one considers that the member states of the Common Market 
are truly sovereign nations with divergent histories, laws and languages. 
The comparison between the jurisdictional rules of the Brussels Con-
vention and our own awkward approaches suggests that the Europeans are 
ahead of us. In one respect, however, the Convention falls seriously short 
of the standards of jurisdictional propriety that have emerged in the United 
States. Since state court jurisdiction is circumscribed by the fourteenth 
amendment and since nonresident aliens are entitled to due process protec-
tion, 115 the American law on jurisdiction is, on its face, nondiscrimina-
tory, 116 although the Supreme Court has never expressly confirmed this 
1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1575 (attorney-client privilege); Estasis Salotti di Colzani v. 
RUWA Polstereimaschinen GmbH (Case No. 24/76), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1831 (Pre-
liminary Ruling) ("informed consent" required for forum selection clause that changes the 
normal rules of jurisdiction). 
111. Protocol art. 5, par. I incorporates by reference the Protocol on the Statute of the 
Court of Justice of the European Economic Co=unities, Apr. 17, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 147 
(1958), art. 20, par. 2 of which authorizes the submission of statements and written observa-
tions in proceedings concerning preliminary rulings. 
112. This class includes those that are not parties to the Brussels Convention and the Pro-
tocol but have merely undertaken to accede to these instruments. See Industrie Tessili Italiana 
Como v. Dunlop AG (Case No. 12/76), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1473 (Preliminary Ruling) 
(observations submitted by the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom). 
113. See, e.g., Pendy Plastic Prods. B.V. v. Pluspunkt Handelsgesellschaft mbH (Case No. 
228/81), 1982 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 2723 (Preliminary Ruling); Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV 
v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace SA (Case No. 21/76), 1976 E. Co=. Ct. J. Rep. 1735 (Prelimi-
nary Ruling). 
114. See text at note 57 supra. 
115. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308,318 (1952) (dictum); Russian Volunteer Fleet 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931). But c.f. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) ("legiti-
mate distinction" between citizens and aliens). 
116. Even federal courts, whose jurisdiction is limited by the due process clause of the fifth 
rather than the fourteenth amendment, consider it axiomatic that a nonresident alien's amena-
bility to suit is controlled by International Shoe and its progeny. See, e.g., American Land 
Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 n.1 (10th 
Cir. 1983) (diversity case); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 n.7 
(9th Cir. 1977) (trademark infringement); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 
1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975) (patent infringement); see also Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 
(1982) (foreign nation a "person" for purposes of due process). Indeed, several circuit court 
opinions have intimated that the defendant's alienage and nonresidence are factors that cau-
tion against the assertion of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rocke v. Canadian Auto. Sport Club, 660 
F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1981) ("sovereignty barrier" higher if defendant resides in a foreign 
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conclusion.117 In stark contrast, the Brussels Convention openly discrimi-
nates against outsiders. While article 3 outlaws recourse to the member 
states' exorbitant jurisdictional bases in actions brought against Common 
Market domiciliaries and corporations, 118 article 4 expressly authorizes the 
continued use of such provisions against parties domiciled outside the 
Common Market.119 The dreary catalog of transgressions upon comity and 
general decency contained in article 3 includes not only article 14 of the 
French Civil Code and section 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, 
but several equally unreasonable jurisdictional assertions found in the laws 
of other member states. Indeed, to accommodate the accession of the Com-
munities' new members to the Brussels Convention, that catalog was fur-
ther lengthened and now includes English transient jurisdiction, Scottish 
and Irish foreign attachments, as well as Danish and Greek assets jurisdic-
tion. Worse yet, the experts charged with drafting the revised version ex-
plicitly rejected the forum non conveniens doctrine as un-European and too 
burdensome for plaintiffs. 120 Thus, outsiders are left without even a modi-
cum of protection against excessive forum shopping and harassment. 121 
nation); Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(Supreme Court jurisdictional cases applicable "a fortiori" to Taiwan company); Leasco Data 
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972) (jurisdiction based on 
effects within the state to be asserted ''with caution, panicularly in an international context"). 
On the other hand, some opinions suggest that a lesser forum nexus is required to proceed 
against aliens in federal question cases, because it should be permissible to aggregate all of the 
contacts such defendants have with the entire United States even in the absence of a federal 
rule or statute that explicitly authorizes nationwide service. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fed-
ders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237-39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981) (dictum); Hon-
eywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum); 
Cyromedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975). But see Wells Fargo & 
Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) (aggregation of contacts with 
the United States as a whole would require amendment of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 
DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276, 1281-83 (D.N.J. 1980), a.ffd 654 
F.2d 280 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981) (same). 
117. See note 54supra and accompanying text; text following note 60supra. 
118. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. 
119. Nor is such unequal treatment limited to jurisdiction; it permeates the entire Conven-
tion and affects the rules on recognition as well as such important safeguards as the right to be 
heard. See generally Juenger, La Convention de Bruxelles du 27 septemhre 1968 et la courtoisie 
internationale, 72 R.C.D.I.P. 37 (1983). In particular, the Convention requires the enforce-
ment of judgments of other member states against "outsiders" even if such judgments are 
premised on exorbitant jurisdictional bases. See Brussels Convention, supra note 78 an. 28; 
von Mehren, Recognition and E,iforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General 
Theory and Current Practice in the European Community and the United States, 81 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 1044, 1059 (1981). 
120. See Schlosser Report, supra note 75, at 97-98. 
121. The Convention's only concession to the interests of third nations concerns the en-
forcement of judgments premised on exorbitant grounds. Brussels Convention art. 59, par. l, 
permits a member state to refuse to enforce such judgments against the domiciliaries of any 
third nation with which the member state has ratified a recognition treaty containing a provi-
sion to that effect. For the history of this concession, see Nadelmann, The Common Market 
Judgments Convention and a Hague Co,iference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. 
L. REV. 1282 (1969). Art. 59 may remain illusory, as demonstrated by the inability of the 
United States to negotiate a recognition treaty with the United Kingdom. See E. SCOLES & P. 
HAY, supra note 98, at 971-72; von Mehren, supra note 119, at 1060 n.61. These authors ad-
duce several reasons to explain the failure of the two major common law nations to reach 
agreement. In addition, the difficulty of drafting a treaty that fully takes into account existing 
1212 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1195 
Yet, strange as it may seem, there is no indication in reported decisions 
to suggest that the Brussels Convention's jurisdictional discrimination has 
posed much of a practical problem. So far, the Court of Justice has never 
been asked to deal with issues relating to article 4, perhaps because Euro-
pean counsel are less adept at forum shopping, or less inclined to resist 
jurisdictional impositions by raising constitutional arguments than their 
American counterparts. Be that as it may, the Convention does expose out-
siders to chicanery and miscarriages of justice. Fortunately, as mentioned 
earlier, 122 the Court of Justice is sensitive to the protection of fundamental 
rights and the need for adequate procedural safeguards. Conceivably, the 
judges in Luxembourg may find a way to remedy, or at least to mitigate, the 
discriminatory aspects of the Brussels Convention once the matter is 
presented to them. 
CONCLUSION 
This brief comparison of interstate and supranational approaches to ju-
dicial jurisdiction indicates that the problems posed by federalism on either 
side of the Atlantic call for similar responses. The European Community 
has made impressive progress coping with these problems in a remarkably 
short span of time. Leaving aside its discriminatory features, the functional 
and pragmatic European approach appears preferable to our reliance on an 
"imprecise inquiry."123 The experience gathered under the Brussels Con-
vention demonstrates that multistate jurisdictional problems are amenable 
to rational solutions, and that national sovereignty need not inhibit the 
framing of workable rules. While this observation suggests the need for a 
reassessment of the territorialist dogma that has prevailed in the United 
States, it is no less true that the Europeans might gain from paying attention 
to American ideas about fundamental rights and procedural fairness. It 
would be deplorable if these two major systems, linked by political realities 
and a shared belief in the rule of law, were to disregard each other's 
accomplishments. 
Supreme Court case law, and the inflexibility of the American negotiating position that re• 
suited from the need to abide by constitutional limitations, may have played a role. 
122. See notes 107-10 supra and accompanying text. 
123. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1487 (1984). 
